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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the nationalization of the Costa Rican Banking System 
in 1948, the Central Bank has played a major role not only in the 
supervision of the state-owned commercial banks, but also in 
their day to day administration. The Central Bank had tradition-
ally defined at what price the financial transactions would take 
place and designed detailed annual credit programs to control the 
distribution of credit among the various sectors of the economy. 
Although the banks are nominally autonomous institutions, they 
must conform to Government regulations in the purchase of inputs 
(for example, computers, salary levels,). In many respects, the 
state-owned financial institutions have been managed as public 
utilities, with virtually no institutional autonomy. 
In recent years, however, this control has been loosened, as 
a result of government policies directed towards liberalization 
of financial markets in Costa Rica. The banks have obtained 
greater operational autonomy with regard to setting interest-rate 
structures and in the distribution of credit. Because of this 
greater freedom, competition among state owned-banks and private 
financial institutions has increased significantly. The need to 
compete has highlighted important administrative rigidities 
within the state-owned commercial banks, which will require a 
serious effort in organizational transformation. 
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The weaknesses in their administrative structure are most 
evident in the area of deposit mobilization. These banks have 
had difficulties recovering real growth in deposit mobilization 
following a period of financial instability which afflicted the 
Costa Rican economy in the early 1980s. The lack of insti tu-
tional autonomy and clearly defined objectives has hampered their 
ability to respond to this crisis. 
In 1987, following a long transition towards financial 
liberalization, the banks were freed from interest-rate and 
selective-credit controls. However, this new found freedom was 
short-lived as credit ceilings and a gentleman's agreement on 
interest rates were reimposed on state-controlled banks at the 
beginning of 1988. This action on the part of the Costa Rican 
Government resulted from an unanticipated growth in inflation and 
overvaluation of the colon. Another reason was competition for 
savings in the financial markets. Although there is an important 
process of institutional transformation of state-owned commercial 
banking in Costa Rica, the evolution to greater institutional 
autonomy and greater competition has been slow. 
The objective of this paper is to highlight the major issues 
and problems in the area of deposit mobilization within the 
state-owned commercial banks. The major conclusions are derived 
from an analysis focused primarily on the Banco Nacional with 
only a cursory view of Banco de Costa Rica. Although not all of 
the statements and conclusions drawn may apply to all state-owned 
banks, I have tried to contrast experiences when possible. In 
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the second section, internal organizational issues surrounding 
deposit mobilization will be analyzed, while in the third, 
specific types of instruments and strategies will be presented. 
In the fourth section, the impact of greater competition for 
domestic savings and the responses by state-owned banks will be 
considered. In the fifth section, data on deposit mobilization 
will be presented, in order to substantiate some of the con-
clusions drawn in the paper. The final section will provide a 
summary of the major findings. 
II. GENERAL ORGANIZATION 
Implicit in the present organizational structure and 
philosophy of the state-owned banks is the view that deposit 
mobilization is not an independent service in itself. Its 
importance is related to supplying necessary inputs for credit 
services. Their organizational structure does not include a 
central off ice or department responsible for developing and 
implementing an institutional strategy in this area, nor are 
there clear lines of responsibility. 
The Finance Department within the Banco Nacional and the 
Planning Department in the Banco de Costa Rica have very recently 
been made responsible for setting branch-level targets for 
deposit mobilization and to carry out some degree of ex-post 
evaluation. However, these targets are considered more as 
informal guidelines rather than strict operational objectives. 
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Their role is centered primarily on improving the efficiency of 
liquidity management. 
In general, there is an excessive degree of administrative 
centralization within the state-owned commercial banks. In the 
area of deposit mobilization this centralization is complete. 
Branch offices are given no flexibility whatsoever to negotiate 
interest rates with depositors. Furthermore, they enjoy no 
independence in the use of these funds, despite having mobilized 
them at the local level. The degree of administrative centraliz-
ation is somewhat less severe in the Banco de Costa Rica than 
that obse~ved in the Banco Nacional. 
The internal operations of state-owned banks have unmis-
takably been molded by many years of detailed selective credit 
controls (topes de cartera). All resources mobilized are placed 
at the disposition of the main office, which must ration and 
distribute them in accordance with pre-established credit limits. 
Authority to extend credit beyond these limits at the branch 
level had to be sought from the main off ice and ultimately from 
the Central Bank. These restrictions effectively eliminated the 
single most important incentive for deposit mobilization on the 
part of branch level offices. When confronted with an excess 
demand for credit, for example, branch managers cannot rely on 
liability management, since they have no independence with regard 
to the administration of these funds. 
The Finance Committee within the Banco Nacional is re$pon-
sible for financial management. Although decisions on interest-
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rate pol icy on loans are reserved for the Board of Directors, 
this Committee utilizes interest rates on time deposits as one of 
their primary policy instruments with which to resolve short-term 
liquidity problems. However, the focus of this Committee in so 
far as it relates to deposit mobilization is extremely short-
term, and almost exclusively concerned with time deposits. In 
the case of the Banco de Costa Rica, interest-rate policies are 
centralized in the hands of the General Manager, together with a 
team of advisors. 
As pointed out above, there does not exist a deposit 
mobilization department in either of the banks and, as a result, 
the administrative structure as it relates to deposit mobiliza-
tion is highly fragmented. There is a savings mobilization 
department in the central office at the Banco Nacional and its 
responsibilities include centralized accounting on time deposits 
for the entire bank. However, with regard to other liability 
instruments, its responsibility is limited only to the branch 
which is located in the same building. 
As a result, branch-level offices do not maintain detailed 
records with regard to the volume and number of time deposits. 
Detailed branch-level information does not exist and therefore an 
evaluation of their relative performance is impossible at the 
present time. The statistics of many smaller branch offices are 
consolidated with the accounting information of larger offices. 
There are no employee bonuses or incentive programs in place 
at either bank which could help motivate a more aggressive effort 
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in deposit mobilization. On the contrary, both the absolute 
quantitative limits on total credit (programa crediticio) and 
lack of independence in tbe disposition of local deposits 
mobilized may in fact provide a strong disincentive. In con-
trast, the Banco de Costa Rica has implemented a system of 
Accou~t Executives, creating a more comprehensive approach to 
marketing of financial services. This marketing strategy is 
targeted towards very large public- and private-sector clients. 
During the last quarter of 1987, in an effort to improve the 
effic$ency in liquidity aanagement of Central Government finances 
and sterilize some excess liquid.i,ty in the market, the Central 
Bank issued a directive prohil;>iting autonomous public-sector 
in,ti tutions from ma.i,ntaining deposits outside of the Central 
Bank. The state-owned banks faced the pt"ospect of loosing all 
deposits mobilized from various public institutions. In the case 
of ~anco Nacional, these deposits represented a significant 
proportion of total deposits. In.i tially, this directive led to a 
sign.if .icant transfer of funds out of the commercial banks and to 
a significant rise in the market rate of interest, as the banks 
co111.Peted for deposits from the pub~ic with which to replace these 
lost resources. Banco de Costa Rica raised its interest rates on 
six month time deposits from 21 to 25 percent. 
Because of resistance on the part of branch managers in 
Banco de Costa Rica to this more aggressive interest rate policy, 
a mechanism of transfer pricing has been i.nstituted. Branches 
froa ~ich transfers are made are com.pen.sated. only for the 
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interest costs incurred. Such a formal mechanism does not yet 
exist in Banco Nacional. However, transfer pricing is of limited 
use, because in neither institution is there a functional cost 
accounting system which would allow an effective evaluation of 
relative branch profitability or operational efficiency. 
The Banco Nacional has 128 off ices distributed throughout 
the country with which to reach the rural population. There are: 
22 branch offices, 58 agencies, and 48 auxiliary offices. This 
large number of off ices clearly gives this bank an important 
competitive advantage in deposit mobilization in the rural area. 
The Banco de Costa Rica, which has traditionally served the urban 
industrial and commercial clientele, has less of a rural pre-
sence. However, this institution has been fairly aggressive in 
opening new offices. In 1987 one new branch office and 10 
agencies were opened, for a total of 25 branch off ices and 19 
agencies. 
The main obstacles facing these banks with regard to deposit 
mobilization are lack of institutional and individual incentives. 
Although the institutional centralization is a function of past 
intervention on the part of the Central Bank, the relaxation of 
these controls will not automatically lead to decentralization. 
Decision making continues to be highly centralized as a result of 
their institutional culture. There does appear to Qe awareness 
of the limitations imposed by excessive centralization within 
both institutions; however, change can be expected to be quite 
slow. 
III. LIABILITY INSTRUMENTS 
Passbeok Savings Accounts 
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Given the wide distribution of off ices throughout the 
countryside, the Banco Nacional has a very good base from which 
to mobilize relatively low cost (financial) funds. The impor-
tance of transactions costs in the demand for passbook savings 
accoUhts has been recognized, and separate cashiers are generally 
provided in all offices. The lack of price competition among 
state owned banks with respect to passbook savings accounts is 
evH1ent. 
the co~petitive strategies followed by the two major state-
owned banks have been focused on differentiating their product 
with the promotion of the computerized networking of off ices in 
the Central Valley. Each institution offers their clientele the 
ability to withdraw funds front a nuinber of different locations. 
This stratE!gy is more coherent for Banco de Costa Rica as a 
majority of its offices are located there. For the vast majority 
of depositors of Banco Nacional this set'vice is inconsequential. 
The Banco de Costa Rica hae instituted a children's passbook 
savings program that pays 2 petoeentage points above the regular 
passbook accounts ( 10 versus 8 percent). Ostensibly, the 
objective of this program is to tea·ch the benefits of savings to 
the young as well as to attempt to create client loyalty of these 
p'i':'esent and future Banco de Costa Rica clients. The program is 
~elatiVely new, and given the long-h:~rm nature of its objectives, 
ev~l'Uatlon o:f ltl!l benefits is diffi~ult. 
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The decision not to compete with respect to interest rates 
on passbook accounts appears to be a logical decision, since 
price discrimination among depositors is not possible as in the 
case of time deposits. However, consistently negative real rates 
of interest on these accounts may in fact be an important 
limitation for real growth. Apparently, in recent years the 
aggressive strategy of deposit mobilization on the part of 
individual credit unions has had an important impact on some 
branches of the state-owned banks. Smaller inst! tut ions with 
lower transactions costs for depositors and higher rates of 
interest have constituted a competitive threat with regard to 
these instruments. 
Another important factor which may limit the interest in 
mobilizing these deposits are high transactions costs. In 
branches outside of the Central Valley, these accounts are not 
computerized and all interest calculations must be carried out 
manually. This obviously places a fairly heavy burden on bank 
employees, and may impose significant transactions costs on 
depositors. 
Time Deposits 
As indicated above, both Banks have been very aggressive in 
the use of interest rates as the major component of their 
competitive strategy in the mobilization of time deposits. In 
the case of Banco Nacional, one of the problems mentioned by the 
officials interviewed was that these deposits are highly con-
centrated in the hands of a few government institutions. There 
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has been some concern expressed within both institutions that the 
overly aggressive use of interest ratest not only creates 
inst•~ility with the transfer of "hot money," but may also hurts 
their relations with preferred clients. Interest rates are 
raised frequently to resolve short--term problems of liquidity, 
and then reduced just as frequently once the problem subsides. 
Checkihg Accounts 
As in th~ case of passbook savings accounts, checking 
accounts are managed in a decentralized fashion. Since these 
dt!f)6tli ts art! nt:>t computerized throughout all branches, conf irma-
ti~n Of baiances must be made by telephone, raising transaetions 
costs to their clients. In both banks a minimum of 20, 000 
~elones is required to open a chet:ldng account. However, no 
minimum average balance must be maint•ined and no monthly charges 
are levied. Because of the lack of a functional cost accounting 
systeaa, the true operational cost of servicing these accounts is 
nbt known. However, without doubt most of their checking 
accounts are not profitable .. Both institutions have recognized 
the importance of an improved cost accounting system and are 
taking $t~~s towards its implementation. A revision of the 
charges levied and minimum balance rectuirements is needed. 
Both in~titutions have recently begun to compete quite 
ag-gressively with Automatic Teller Machines (ATM) and although 
they are very successful in reducing transactions costs for 
cli~nts, their economic rationale !s still unclear. In addition 
tt!> '~reb.lems bf educating and cot\v1ncing clients to use them (a 
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problem which has plagued banks in the U.S. for a long time), a 
review of fees charged for their uses is in order. With a flat 
yearly charge to checking account clients, these machines are 
being used to a large extent to consult balances, a service for 
which the clients would not wait in the long lines at the bank. 
It is frequently argued that the monopoly enjoyed by the 
state-owned commercial banks with respect to checking accounts is 
necessary for their financial survival. However, it is doubtful 
that, if given the opportunity, private banks would attempt to 
compete for the same segment of the market. These banks would 
most likely attempt to capture the very large institutional 
accounts, for which the commercial banks are already facing 
competition from the brokerage houses in the National Stock 
Exchange. However, this pressure has been relieved to some 
degree by the financial crisis at the end of 1987 and beginning 
of 1988. 
IV. COMPETITION IN DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION 
Despite the nominal monopoly on checking accounts, the 
state-owned banks have been faced with competition on the part of 
investment funds promoted by brokerage houses in the National 
Stock Exchange. These funds offer their clients short-term (one 
week) highly liquid investments which pay very attractive rates 
of interest. So far, only Banco de Costa Rica has confronted 
this competition head on, and has devised a mechanism with which 
to pay interest on checking account balances. Likewise, the 
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intense competition for time deposits has induced public-sector 
bankers to devise imaginative ways of reducing reserve require-
ments, as well as increasing the tax free rate of return to 
depositors. 
In spite of the presumed monopoly in mobilizing short-term 
deposits, the state-owned banks have faced fairly stiff competi-
tion from the private banks, brokerage houses, credit unions, 
savings and loan associations as well as from non-regulated 
financial intermediaries. However, as a result of the recent 
panic that has swept the financial markets over the past 6 to 9 
months, the issue of government guarantees has become of primary 
importance to depositors. In recent months, the public-sector 
ba~~s have taken full advantage of this crisis, playing on the 
fear of depositors as their main marketing tool. This crisis has 
reduced the competitive pressures on these institutions, and in 
the present financially-unstable environment they should be able 
to reap some economic rent from government ownership. 
The cumulative effect of the bankruptcy of a few non-
regulated finance companies on the fringes of the financial 
markets, combined with a severe monetary contraction by the 
Central Bank in the last quarter of 1987, set the stage for a run 
on deposits, bringing down one of the more respected regulated 
finance companies: Crediticia. The financial panic was beginning 
to create problems for the private banks; however, given the 
composition of their liabilities, which are heavily weighted with 
long-term loans from the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
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ment. This limited its severity. With advent of the failure of 
Crediticia, the Central Bank and National Stock Exchange injected 
liquidity into markets to avoid further runs. 
The competitive pressure within Costa Rican financial 
markets has diminished significantly since the financial crisis, 
as the gentleman's agreement on interest rates demonstrates. The 
regulatory dichotomy within the Costa Rican financial markets, in 
which one sector enjoys unconditional government guarantees, 
while the other does not even have access to a lender of last 
resort, must be resolved. If not, the.significant progress in 
operational efficiency and innovation observed within the public-
sector banks could suffer a serious setback. 
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION 
In Chart 1 (in the appendix) the volume of total deposits 
mobilized by the Banco Nacional are presented on a semester basis 
from December 1980 to December 1987. In current prices the 
volume mobilized has grown from slightly over 5 billion colones 
at the end of 1980, to 25 billion at the end of 1987. However, 
in constant 1975 colones, total deposit mobilization has actually 
declined slightly over the period. The composition by instrument 
of the volume of mobilized funds is presented in Charts 2 through 
5. It is interesting to note that the volume of time deposits 
mobilized has the most erratic behavior, reflecting the aggres-
sive competition among the banks. Apparently, checking accounts 
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have been the only instrument that has been able to sustain its 
balance over the period, in real terms. 
Chart 6 presents the relative market shares among the state-
owned banks with regard to total deposit mobilization. Banco 
Nacional has lost market share to Banco Costa Rica and Banco 
Anglo Costarricense, while the Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago 
has maintained its market share. Obviously, with the rapid 
growth in the Bolsa Nacional de Va lores and private financial 
intermediaries, the state-owned banks have lost market share if 
the aggreg•te financial markets are considered (lack of an 
adequate data base precludes a more exact analysis here). 
Analysis of Chart 1 through 9 indicates that the distribu-
tion of this loss in total deposit market share for the Banco 
Nacional is heavily concentrated in the area of checking ac-
counts. Recent changes in accounting procedures, which reduce 
their reserve requirements, may have influenced the results for 
the last few months. Still, some erosion of their market share 
is evident. 
Finally, Chart 8 underlines the intense competition among 
the various state-owned banks in time deposits. Savings ac-
counts, on the other hand, have remained quite stable. This has 
reflected the lack of competitive pressure in this segment of the 
market. It must be reiterated that these charts on market share 
only reflect the relative position among the state-owned banks. 
They do not indicate the market share in the financial markets in 
the aggregate. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
In general, as a result of the competitive pressures faced 
by the state-owned banks due to the rapid growth of private 
banks, finance companies and the Costa Rican Stock Exchange, 
institutional changes and innovations designed to improve 
operational efficiency have been evident. In general, the Banco 
de Costa Rica is somewhat more aggressive and innovative than 
Banco Nacional; however, its operational structure suffers from 
many of the same problems. 
The Banco Nacional has a clear comparative advantage in 
deepening its rural deposit mobilization in general, and in 
particular with greater emphasis on passbook savings accounts. 
Consistently negative real rates of interest could inhibite 
greater growth in the volume of resources mobilized with this 
instrument. 
The large investment in rural branch off ices in the Banco 
Nacional makes this a natural target for future deposit mobiliza-
tion efforts. However, the most important obstacle facing this 
institution and the Banco de Costa Rica is the lack of a coherent 
internal organization to facilitate ~~ ~e an aggressive 
long-term strategy for deposit mobilization. There are important 
organizational disincentives for more aggressive deposit mobiliz-
ation, and these must be eliminated in order to maximize the 
returns to past investments in human and physical capital. The 
excess degree of administrative centralization observed in both 
institutions can only be reduced if an effective mechanism for 
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personnel evaluation is devised and implemented. This will 
require an important investment in information management. 
In the aggregate, deposit mo bi 1 izat ion on the part of the 
Banco Nacional has been stagnant over the past six years. The 
growth in resources has not kept up with the growth in inflation. 
In addition, the bank has lost relative market share to the other 
state-owned banks. The lack of competitive pressure among state 
owned banks is evident in passbook savings accounts. There is 
some attempt towards product differentiation in the area of 
checking accounts. This can be seen in the Banco Costa Rica, 
which is indirectly paying interest on these accounts. This 
innovation was motivated primarily through the competition 
generated by brokerage houses in the National Stock Exchange. 
However, the recent panic in financial markets may eliminate this 
competitive threat to the monopoly of the state-owned banks in 
the marketing of this instrument. 
Finally, the recent events disturbing the confidence of the 
depositing public in private financial intermediaries has 
dramatically underlined the serious distortions created by the 
regulatory dichotomy in Costa Rican banking laws. The uneven 
playing field confronting the private financial institutions not 
only places them at a serious competitive disadvantage in 
mobilizing resources, but may have the unintended result of 
reversing of slowing the significant progress observed within the 
public-sector banks in the areas of operational efficiency and 
financial innovation. Ultimately the Costa Rican population will 
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pay the price for the growing inefficiency of their financial 
markets. 
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